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Nicholas Jolley: Causality and Mind: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 296. £45.00 (hb). ISBN: 978-
0199669554.
Nicholas Jolley is an exemplary scholar and a highly engaging writer. He has
published several books on major figures and themes in the early modern
period. These are his Leibniz and Locke (1984), The Light of the Soul
(1990), Locke (1999), and Leibniz (2005). But he has also published numer-
ous articles and chapters in disparate venues. It is fitting, then, that Oxford
University Press has elected to combine a number of these publications in
a single volume, making these scholarly contributions more accessible to
students and researchers alike. This volume does not gather all of Jolley’s
published papers, but it brings together seventeen articles and chapters on
issues pertaining to early modern theories of causality (e.g. God, substance,
volition, and laws of nature) and mind (e.g. innate ideas, abstract ideas,
intentionality, and consciousness). These papers were originally published
in journals, special journal issues, and edited volumes between 1986 and
2010. Some of these papers may be familiar to readers such as the excellent
‘Malebranche on the Soul’, which is Jolley’s contribution to the Cambridge
Companion to Malebranche (2000). Other papers are likely to be less fam-
iliar such as his ‘Leibniz and the Causal Self-Sufficiency of Substances’,
which first appeared in French in a special issue of Revue philosophique
de Louvain (2009) and is provided here for the first time in English.
The papers collected in this volume touch on a subset of canonical figures
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Descartes, Malebranche,
Leibniz, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume. Although two figures, Malebranche
and Leibniz, receive considerably more attention than the others, it is Male-
branche who stands out most in this collection. A full half of the papers either
solely concern Malebranche or include substantive discussion of his views in
conjunction with another figure. A mere five papers make no mention of
occasionalist doctrines. However, this is not necessarily a shortcoming of
the book. Three central issues in the thought of Malebranche receive atten-
tion throughout the volume: the vision in God doctrine according to which
all ideas, perceptions, and sensations in created minds are caused by God;
the occasionalist theory of causation whose emphasis on the logically
necessary connection between causes and effects entails that only God is
causally efficacious; and, finally, the nature of the tripartite relationship
between divine volition, ‘efficacious laws’, and particular events in the
world. Because these articles and chapters were not originally written with
an eye to being bound in a single volume, it is surprising how little repetition

























we find in Jolley’s several treatments of Malebranche. This speaks of
Jolley’s talent and ingenuity as a scholar. All told, he considers a variety
of possible objections to these occasionalist doctrines, pries into the philoso-
phical motivations for them, traces their development across Malebranche’s
writings, and argues that some of these doctrines either foreshadow or bear
considerable resemblance to contemporary philosophical positions. It is for
this reason that many of the papers in this volume, when taken together, offer
a penetrating and intricate analysis of Malebranche’s position.
Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke each have at least one paper dedicated
solely, or at least primarily, to their respective views. Other figures, such
as Berkeley and Hume, are discussed strictly in conjunction with Male-
branche. It is clear that comparison with occasionalist doctrines can be phi-
losophically rewarding. Two papers comparing Leibniz and Malebranche,
‘Leibniz and Malebranche on Innate Ideas’ and ‘Leibniz and Occasional-
ism’, are especially rich and seem to bring out the very best in both thinkers.
One wishes that this model were adopted in more cases. Another paper on
Leibniz, which draws on Malebranche to a lesser extent, ends with a remark-
ably sweeping conclusion: ‘Malebranche’s theory of causality [is] philoso-
phically fruitful. By contrast, Leibniz’s account of causality [is] a
philosophical dead end’ (168). Such a statement seems unwarranted and
risks being shortsighted, especially when the only evidence offered on its
behalf is that Malebranche’s view ‘leads straight to Hume’ (168). One
might respond by challenging the strength of the implied connection
between Malebranche and Hume or perhaps by denying the assumption
that ‘lead[ing] straight to Hume’ is evidence of bearing philosophical fruit.
It is unfortunate that one of the two papers on Berkeley as well as the only
paper on Hume appear to fall into the category of unprofitable comparisons
with Malebranche. These are his ‘Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality
and Volition’ and ‘Hume, Malebranche, and the Last Occult Quality’. The
former paper argues, less resourcefully than is usual for Jolley, that Berkeley
adopts a distinctly Malebranchean concept of causality. The paper then goes
on to criticize Berkeley from multiple angles, both occasionalist and ration-
alist, for failing to deliver an account of voluntary action that satisfies the cri-
teria set out by Malebranche. Jolley concludes that ‘Berkeley’s position on
causality is, at bottom, incoherent’ (253). Perhaps a more philosophically
coherent theory can be found in Berkeley once we unburden him from
what are, arguably, imposed commitments. Jolley’s paper on Hume argues
that Malebranche offers the ‘more progressive and interesting’ theory of cau-
sation (256). Hume, we learn, advances a view still laden with a vaguely
‘Scholastic notion of causality’; while Malebranche, by contrast, articulates
‘the more precise notion of law’ (255). I fear that Jolley, at the very least, has
ended the disagreement between Malebranche and Hume prematurely. There
is ample room here for an analysis of these two thinkers that is as engaging
and sophisticated as his work comparing Malebranche and Leibniz. More


























Hume’s naturalist project and the purpose of his regular excursions into
ordinary human psychology. Hume endeavours to explain the motivation
underlying both philosophical and commonsensical propensities to think
of the world in causal terms. Drawing on experience and psychological ten-
dencies, Hume has the resources to explain why philosophers have embraced
certain causal theories despite the failure of these theories to explain any-
thing about causation itself. It is evident from the sustained criticism of
Malebranche across multiple texts that Hume takes his view of causation
to be among them.
Joshua M. Wood
Wellesley College
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